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ARTICLES
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: FINDING THE
BALANCE BETWEEN DELANEY AND FREE PLAY




The challenge in developing a strategy for managing environ-
mental risk is in finding a balance between extremes. One
extreme is exemplified in a Delaney-like Clause1 that bans any
activity which creates pollution. The other extreme is in
permitting unrestrained free play.
The purpose of this Article is to propose a set of principles
and guidelines for determining an appropriate course of action
that recognizes the impracticability of zero risk while at the same
time considering the costs of private market transactions without
Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Cecilia Yen Koo Professor of Decision Sciences and Public Policy &
Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; Co-Director,
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center.
We would like to acknowledge the very helpful comments and editorial
assistance from Steven Bray. Partial support for this paper was provided by the
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center.
' The Delaney Clause was enacted by Congress in 1958 and absolutely
prohibits the use of food additives found to induce cancer in man or animals.
See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). It has been interpreted as a "zero risk"
philosophy. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive
Judicia-Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 523 (1989). For more
details on the implications of the Delaney Clause for risk assessment, see Joseph
Rodricks & Michael R. Taylor, Application of Risk Assessment to Food Saety
Decision Making, in READINGS IN RISK 143 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael
Gough eds., 3d ed. 1993).
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any restrictions. To begin with, this Article contrasts the relevant
tradeoffs facing companies where there is central government
control with those that have property rights. These two scenarios
suggest a conceptual framework for alternative policy programs to
deal with environmental problems.
This Article then examines these programs under regimes
where firms have property rights and where they do not. Using
an analogy regarding how a city provides parking for vehicles, this
Article evaluates the costs and benefits of alternative strategies that
may be relevant in dealing with environmental risks. This Article
concludes by arguing for a system of more closely specified
standards and regulations for managing environmental risks.
2. SETTING THE SCENE THROUGH SCENARIOS
Our story begins with the following scenario:
The Complete Oil Refinery Enterprise ("CORE")2 is
producing a variety of different hydrocarbon fuels that
help to power internal combustion engines. These engines
in turn provide motion power for vehicles and energy for
the generation of electricity. The vehicles-trucks, trains,
and aircraft-carry people and commodities to and fro.
The electricity produces machines that simplify many
chores that had previously been undertaken by hand, such
as cultivating and harvesting crops, and washing clothes in
the river.
These labor-saving and liberating benefits are dependent on the
availability and use of fuel. The benefits, however, need to be
balanced against the adverse environmental impacts of pollution,
which affect both the groundwater, through leaks from under-
ground storage tanks, and the ambient atmosphere through
emissions into the air. This impact on the environment can affect
both current and future generations. Moreover, it will be difficult
to reverse some of the environmental damage that has already
been incurred.
2 All names of enterprises, government bodies, and legislative acts in this
Article are designed to be fictional.
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2.1. Version 1: Central Government Control
One way to balance risks with benefits is through a command
and control procedure where a centralized government ("CG"),
acting through a central committee and specialized subcommittees,
designs and implements strict procedures for limiting the pollution
of the refinery. Resources are allocated to CORE by the central
committee and its specialized subcommittees. This arrangement
is depicted in Figure 1. Such a world involves no property rights,
with no significant rights in corporate property for organizations
such as CORE; no rights in contract; and no right to complain
about invasions of corporate enterprise by government inspectors
or expropriators, or by other concerned parties. The central
committee retains the right to restrict and punish such "private"
initiatives by groups such as popular activists or terrorists.
I Figure 1: Command and Control Through a Centralized Government (CG)
This is a substantially accurate description of state socialism in
practice as illustrated by the former Soviet Union, the Eastern
European economies under the prior regime, and the current
regimes in China and Cuba. In such a system, the CG can impose
any sanctions it desires without the management or employees of
the refinery having any formal right to protest the action. Thus,
1997]
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if the leaders of the CG want to limit the pollution-generating
activities of CORE in any way, or wish to close down CORE
altogether, it would have the right to do so.
Under this type of centralized control there are limited
immediate transaction costs between the government and business
enterprises in determining what actions should be taken.3
Decisions are made from the top without any obligation to
receive input from those who are directly involved in the relevant
activities. Authority to use information and knowledge resides
with the heads of government. Learning from those more familiar
with the risk is incidental and unsystematic. By the same token,
monitoring costs are high, since it is the responsibility of the CG
to exercise command and control procedures.4 Employees at
CORE have every incentive to engage in activities that conceal
risks for which they would be held responsible. Midnight
dumping of waste, for example, would be prevalent.
In more formal terms, the CG would be viewed as the
principal and CORE would be considered the agent.5 There
would be asymmetric information between these two parties. The
CG has control over the means of dealing with pollution
problems, but CORE has a near monopoly of information
indicating the specific kind, variety, and magnitude of the
pollution effects. There is no binding contract for undertaking
specific tasks, since CORE has no property rights and no
autonomy in its interaction with the CG.
To the extent that the agent has special knowledge or the
ability to undertake activities that the principal cannot detect, the
outcome of the process will be suboptimal. Learning about the
risks over time is restricted, since the agent has every incentive to
reveal only information that bolsters its position. The costs of
ferreting out such data may be very high.
3 For a discussion of these transaction costs and their impact in a
regulatory context, see Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM.
U.L. REv. 323, 329-35 (1987).
4 For a discussion of this process in an environmental context, see Carol
M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE Lj. 1, 29 (1991).
1 For more detail on the structure of principal-agent problems, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1012-15 (1995).
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2.2. Version 2: Enterprises With Property Rights
Under this version there would still be a centralized govern-
ment that has the responsibility of balancing the benefits and costs
of environmental risks to society. However, CORE and other
enterprises have property rights and recourse to the courts
through a legal system should they feel they have been treated
unfairly. CORE's managers and other operators have a legal
identity that is distinct from both CG and CORE and are
accountable both as employees of CORE and as citizens. The
dynamics of the relationship between government and business
are, as a consequence, radically different from those under the CG
system.
CORE is owned by shareholders who have an interest in
seeing that the enterprise is profitable, whereby they earn a high
enough return on their investment to justify maintaining their
equity in the firm. They thus have an interest in monitoring the
activities of the refinery, even if in an indirect fashion. The
government specifies a set of rules and regulations that address the
environmental risk issues and administers them through a
government agency. For illustrative purposes, suppose that the
Environmental Responsibility Body ("ERB") is created for this
purpose. The forms of interaction between these different groups
and entities is shown in Figure 2.
6 See id. at 1014.
19971
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The procedures of ERB could take on a number of different
forms that would be sanctioned by legislation, such as the Oil
Pollution Prevention Act ("OPPA").' At one extreme, ERB
could issue a rule that prohibited CORE from emitting any
pollution. If any violations were detected, ERB could invoke
procedures to close the refinery. If the managers of CORE or its
shareholders felt the ruling was unfair, they could protest this
action and take the case to court.
Such a system would require expensive monitoring and control
procedures on the part of ERB to determine whether the refinery
had been responsible for any pollution. In fact, no refinery can
operate without generating some adverse environmental effects.
If the rule indeed prohibited all environmental pollution, then
CORE would be shut down. Hence, the result of this ruling
would be no refinery products, no vehicles, and no electricity.
A more modest option for ERB would be to issue a regulation
that limits pollution from CORE's activities. If the refinery
exceeded the limit imposed, then ERB would have the authority
to penalize CORE. For example, the penalty for exceeding the
7 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
Figure 2: Control Through a Legal System
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proscribed limits could range from a fine of $1000 (for a first
offense) to closing the business (for a third or fourth offense).
The refinery could challenge these penalties if it could provide
evidence showing that it had not exceeded its limits.
CORE could also challenge the regulation by producing
scientific data that the environmental risk from pollution was
minimal, so that the magnitude of the penalties imposed were
extreme and unfair. The court system would have to rule on this
question. In any event, there would be a need for ERB to
determine whether CORE had exceeded specific pollution limits
and to defend its position in court. CORE would have a right to
produce its own counter evidence. This could involve substantial
costs to both the government and the refinery.
A third option would be to establish a liability system that
holds CORE responsible for any illnesses, deaths, or damage to
the environment from its pollution. If there were well-specified
penalties associated with these consequences, and if the risks
associated with different levels of pollution could be computed,
then CORE would undertake some type of cost-benefit analysis
in determining the nature of its activities. Cost-benefit analyses
of this kind have been examined at the theoretical level in the law
and economics literature.8
The use of this form of legal liability for controlling environ-
mental risks requires that it be feasible to estimate the risks
associated with pollution from the refinery. More specifically, it
requires the ability to prove to a tolerable degree of plausibility
the existence of a casual link between pollution from CORE and
environmental damage and harm to humans.9 The devil lurks in
the details of defining and proving a standard such as "tolerable
degree of plausibility." For example, there will very likely be
long delays between exposure to pollution and the onset of illness,
such that other factors besides the pollution from the refinery
8 For a detailed treatment, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). An illuminating
set of papers on the role of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating regulations can
be found in RISK, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS
FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
9 For an explanation of the difficulty in establishing this causal link, see
Dale Hattis & David Kennedy, Assessing Risks from Health Hazards: An
Imperfect Science, in READINGS IN RISK 156, 157-59 (Theodore S. Glickman &
Michael Gough eds., 3d ed. 1993).
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may be responsible for negative environmental impacts. The
method of proof is expensive, and to some degree indeterminant,
as demonstrated, for example, in the case of asbestos10
A liability system may create a role for insurance as a fourth
option for dealing with the pollution risk. By estimating the risks
associated with pollution, the insurer could provide CORE with
coverage against harm and damage in return for a premium. The
terms of the insurance contract would be specified in advance.
For an insurer to be willing to offer a policy, it would have to be
able to estimate the likelihood of adverse environmental events
and their consequences, so as to be able to determine what
premium to charge. If the insurer felt that the probabilities of
certain events were highly ambiguous, or that the amount of
liability for which CORE would be responsible was uncertain,
then it might want to charge a premium that would exceed what
the refinery is willing to pay. In such a case, the pollution risk
would be considered uninsurable."
We can examine the relationship between CORE and ERB in
Version 2 using the concepts of principal-agent theory. The roles
of the two parties are identical to those described in Version 1,
but their behavior is likely to be very different. ERB, the
principal, is now mindful that the refinery has property rights and
recourse in the courts should ERB try to enforce policies that
CORE feels are excessively harmful to its operation.
Both ERB and CORE are at some risk if ERB undertakes to
promulgate a regulation that the courts might hold excessive, or
to enforce a regulation on the basis of evidence that the courts
might consider inadequate.1 2 If a proposed regulation is held by
the courts to be too stringent, or enforcement denied for lack of
adequate proof of violation, ERB will have failed in its regulatory
10 See PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK THROUGH INSURANCE 55-62 (1997).
" There are a number of conditions that must be met for a risk to be
insurable, such as absence of adverse selection and moral hazard, which are
beyond the scope of this paper. For a more detailed discussion of these
conditions in the context of environmental risk, see id. at 37-48.
12 For example, in 1992 the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
set aside an EPA final order which allowed the use of four carcinogenic
pesticides, holding that this action violated the Delaney Clause. See Les v.
Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992).
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mission and could well suffer political embarrassment as a
result.13
By the same token, if the regulation is upheld by the courts,
or proof of violation is deemed to be adequately established, then
CORE will suffer corresponding financial embarrassment, and
perhaps political embarrassment as well. In cultures where the
media play an active role, companies found to be pollution
violators can suffer severe consequences, not only financially but
also in "public opinion."1 4  In any event, the litigation and
legislative processes that are involved will entail substantial
transaction costs to both ERB and CORE.
Given the existence of a legal system, there are incentives for
the refinery and the government to share information on the risks
and to develop formal contractual or quasi-contractual relation-
ships to deal with negative events. Both parties have incentives to
reduce the monitoring and transaction costs associated with
determining the risk and settling their differences. The refinery
is likely to have information on its operations and the generation
of pollution that may be difficult for the government to obtain
without considerable expense. The challenge for ERB is to
develop a set of incentives to induce CORE to behave in a way
that meets the objectives of ERB without having to engage in
costly policing activities.
3. How SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL RISK BE MANAGED?
3.1. A Conceptual Framework
The above two scenarios suggest the following simple
conceptual framework for managing environmental risks, as
depicted in Figure 3. In the center of the diagram are a set of
programs and policies ranging from command and control
procedures to incentives and insurance. There are four stake-
holders who must either follow or evaluate these programs and
policies: the government, regulatory agencies as represented by
ERB, businesses such as CORE, and the courts.
13 Political embarrassment can translate into legislative restrictions on ERB
or cuts in its budget.
14 Pertinent recent examples include Exxon's experiences after the
grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, and Union Carbide's
experiences after the mishap at its plant in Bhopal, India. See Bhopal. Ten Years
On, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 78.
1997]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.2. No Property Rights
As we have seen, there is a set of potential programs that can
be administered by the government in conjunction with the
affected business enterprise. When a business does not have any
property rights, and its executives have no autonomy apart from
their role as managers, then government has complete legal
authority and will use command and control procedures to
enforce its will.
One way of understanding the environmental disasters in the
East countries under the Communist system is to recognize that
managers of enterprises - the steel and chemical factories; the
atomic energy plants, oil wells and pipelines - did not have
control of the operations of these enterprises. Rather, the
operations were controlled by distant planners wielding authority
over output.15 The socialist theory contemplated that the costs
involved in achieving output would be transparent. In fact, these
costs indeed appeared to the highest level of authority to be
reasonable, but only because they were concealed by under-
15 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN CEN-
TRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: U.S. EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE INSTI-
TUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, GA1.13:RCED-94-41 (1994).
Figure 3: Framework for Examining Risk Management Strategies
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reporting, non-reporting, or simply lying.
It is well known that management of enterprises in the Soviet
system faced relentless requirements for fulfilling nominal quotas,
regardless of quality. An immediate and obvious way of cutting
cost was to disregard environmental consequences. 6 In effect,
the distant planners had no responsibility with respect to limiting
the external costs of achieving output. By the same token, local
management had no means of planning and budgeting against
environmental pollution, any more than they could plan and
budget for other long term needs of the enterprise.
It should not be assumed that managerial irresponsibility
leading to adverse environmental consequences is unique to a
socialist system. Similar problems can arise in property-based
systems such as our own, either between the Government and
private enterprise or within business enterprises. That is, private
enterprises have incentives to under-report or to lie to the
Government. Divisions within business enterprises have similar
incentives in relation to top corporate management."7  The
unique feature of the socialist systems was their inability to
recognize the problem.
In the theory of state socialism there was "objective truth"
about the world, including such tedious details as the effluents
from refineries and factories, etc. The acquisition of this informa-
tion involved no transaction costs, or merely negligible ones.
Objective truth was accessible to anyone in the social system, and
therefore could be obtained as easily at lower levels as at the top.
Any discrepancy between the perception of reality at the top and
perceptions at lower levels would be attributable to inadequate
comprehension - that is, "error" - at the lower levels.
3.3. Property Rights
In a capitalist system, given that enterprises have property
rights, it is necessarily presupposed that there is a legal system to
recognize and enforce those rights. "Property" - whether in a
16 See, e.g., Cleaning Up Russia, J. COM., Nov. 14, 1994, at 8A.
17 A 1992 survey of corporate counsel found that sixteen percent of
companies surveyed had altered reported environmental audit information, in
the absence of a federally recognized corporate environmental self-audit
privilege. Marianne Lavelle, More Lawyers Expect to Urge Their Clients to
Examine Compliance, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 16, 1992, at S6.
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refinery, a factory building, or in shares of a company that owns
such a facility - is a legal relationship. Ownership confers the
right to use the facility and the right to exclude others from
interfering with it, subject of course various legal controls on the
ways the facility may be used. Also presupposed is a judicial
system in place that will settle disputes between government and
business over regulations and their administration. Regulations
and incentive programs are now an integral and familiar part of
a strategy for managing environmental risk."
The decision-making process of the company, in response to
a set of environmental regulations and incentives, is guided by
corporation and contract law. Under corporation law, manage-
ment's activities are subject to review by the board of directors
and to intervention by the shareholders or by creditors in extreme
situations. Execution of company programs and policies is carried
out through a complex matrix of contractual arrangements. The
directors carry out their authority to hire the CEO and other top
executives; top management hires the rest of the staff, in the case
of an established business usually by continuing the employment
of staff already in place. The staff, under the direction of the
legally constituted company management, formulates policy and
carries it through by appropriating the funds and deploying the
personnel necessary to the task. In short, the management of a
business in a capitalist system is a legally constituted regime of
private government with its own fiscal and personnel powers. 9
A correlative to corporate property rights is the concept of
personal autonomy on the part of corporate officials. Members
of a corporate board have personal responsibilities going beyond
interaction with management; management has responsibilities
going beyond deference to the board of directors.2' Lower
echelon personnel have authority and responsibility as citizens as
well as employees. The role of a "whistle blower" is simply a
"' For a discussion of the evolution of this strategy, and a look at the
future of managing environmental risk, see Samuel P. Hayes, The Future of
Environmental Regulation, 15 U. PITT. J. L. & COM. 549 (1996).
19 The classic exposition is ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991).
20 See generally, ARTHUR FLEISHER ET AL., BOARD GAMES: THE
CHANGING SHAPE OF CORPORATE POWER (1988). For an illustration of this
concept in the context of a managerial buyout of a public company, see Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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dramatic illustration of this autonomy.21 A less visible but
pervasive form of the autonomy of corporate employees is their
right to quit if their jobs become unbearable. This regime based
on property rights and individual legal autonomy is more complex
than a centralized control system. However, paradoxically it is
almost certainly capable of greater efficiency.
3.4. Evaluating Alternative Programs
Each of the programs outlined in the conceptual framework
in Figure 3 requires addressing the following questions:
* What types of data are required to administer the
program?
* How costly and time consuming is it to obtain these
data?
o How accurate are the data likely to be under the
specific institutional structure in place?
* Can the accumulation and transmission of relevant data
modify existing programs at a reasonable cost?
o What are the impacts of the program on the different
stakeholders? These impacts can include economic, social
and psychological factors incurred in the present as well as
in future periods.
* How much should each stakeholder pay for the
measurable direct costs and transaction costs of the
program?
These questions address issues of both efficiency and equity.
With respect to efficiency, it is certainly possible to compare
alternative political systems as well as programs in terms of their
performance and costs borne by different stakeholders. The
question as to how much each stakeholder should pay is an equity
issue and will be determined by a country's political process.
4. AN ANALOGY: PARKING IN THE CITY
This Article will now illustrate a set of alternative programs
21 See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon & Terry D. Garcia, Protecting the Corporate
Whistle Blower Under FederalAnti-Retaliation Statutes, 5 J. CORP. L. 275 (1980).
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in the context of the following non-environmental problem facing
a municipality: determining how to provide parking for vehicles
in the city. Several strategies can be followed in dealing with this
issue.
4.1. Command and Control
The city can post signs on designated streets indicating where
cars have a right to park during certain hours of the day (e.g.,
non-rush hour). Vehicles parked in non-designated spaces, or
during times that are prohibited, would be physically removed
from the space by municipal authorities. It is up to the city
government to decide whether or not to return the vehicle.
Owners of the cars would have no rights under this type of
regime.
Under such a system the only information collected by the
city would be on the status of the vehicle with respect to parking
spots. There would be no officially recognized data on the needs
of the vehicle owners or the reasons why they may have chosen
to be in a non-designated space (e.g., whether a person was a
doctor making an emergency call). It could be predicted,
however, that information of this kind would be transmitted
informally and utilized by the authorities through some form of
corruption or bribery.
4.2. Regulatory System
Another strategy would be for the city to construct parking
lots whereby a person paid for the right to leave a vehicle for
various lengths of time. Vehicles would be prohibited from
parking on the streets. Those found on the streets would
certainly be towed, and possibly destroyed. The parking lot
would be monitored by an attendant who collected the applicable
fee and ensured that vehicles were safe during their stay. Through
privatizing parking, the city can control the flow of cars while at
the same time collecting revenue for the service it provides. If the
city wants to encourage people to come downtown for shopping,
it could provide free parking, as is done in shopping malls today.
Under such a regulatory system the owners of vehicles have
wider discretion than under a command and control system.
They are provided with information on the costs associated with
parking and can decide accordingly whether to bring their vehicles
into the city or use other means of transportation. They still,
[Vol. 18:2
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however, have no recourse to the courts if they feel their car has
been unjustly removed (e.g., parking on the street if all lots are
temporarily full).
4.3. Incentive System
Rather than constructing parking lots, the city might install
meters. Vehicle owners now have the option to pay for parking
or to take their chances by not depositing money in the meter.
The decision as to what course of action to follow will be
determined by each individual's assessment of the chances of being
detected and the magnitude of the fine. In essence, the meter
charge can be viewed as an insurance premium that provides
protection to the vehicle owner against the much larger, and
uncertain, cost of a fine.
Under such an incentive system, there are costs associated with
monitoring the vehicles as well as collecting the money deposited
in the meters. Vehicle owners have a right to protest the fine by
appearing in court and indicating why they feel they may be
unfairly penalized (e.g., the meter was broken). Hence, there is
also a set of legal processing costs associated with prosecuting
those individuals who violate the law.
4.4. Comparison of Systems
Each of the above systems implies a set of decisions regarding
who should pay and how much. To the extent that one wants to
discourage driving in the city, one could construct fewer lots
and/or charge high fees to park. If one wants to reduce the time
spent monitoring meters, then one could charge extremely high
fines so that people would want to pay the relatively small
parking fee even if the probability of being caught was known to
be relatively small.
5. CONTRASTING THE PARKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
PROBLEMS
5.1. Formal Similarities
The parking problem and the problem of dealing with
environmental risks are formally similar, but very different in
substantive complexity. Both problems can be analyzed in terms
of the following factors:
* The various types of institutional mechanisms for dealing
1997]
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with the problem. These range from centralized government
control, at one extreme, to insurance and private contracts
enforced through a system of legal rules.
o Cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit calculations also can
address a range of issues ranging from micro-system determina-
tions of the appropriate charges for specific transactions, such as
the fee for parking in a particular garage, to macro-system
determination of the social costs and benefits of a particular set of
policies.'
o The incentives and disincentives for exchange of accurate
information about conditions and changes within the system. In
the case of parking, for example, the lot attendant has a different
incentive for noting the presence of a vehicle for which a parking
fee should be charged than does a driver calculating whether he
can "beat the meter." In the case of environmental risk, the
incentives for providing accurate information could be quite
different for top level management, whether in a government
agency or in a corporation, than for lower level operatives dealing
directly with the process.
* The "relevant" parameters of the specific system. In the case
of parking, should the definition of the system include alternative
means of transportation, such as buses or light rail? In the case of
environmental risk, should the definition of the system include
the possibility of relocating the refinery in another region of the
country or in some other part of the world? 3
* The "relevant" costs and benefits. As is now generally
recognized, there is no a priori definition of relevant costs and
relevant benefits in any system. In the parking problem, what
account should be given to the costs involved when a vehicle
owner has to walk a block or two after parking? What of the
concerns of women who must walk alone after parking at night?
Is it a benefit or a cost that abundant parking encourages middle
class workers to move to the suburbs? In the environmental risk
problem, what account should be taken of the effect that certain
' For a discussion of the difficulty of valuing such costs and benefits, see
Robin Gregory et al., Valuing Environmental Resources: A Constructive
Approach, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 177 (1993).
' For a discussion of the issues related to deciding where to site facilities
which pose potential threats to the environment, see Ralph L. Keeney & Detlof




regulations have on the employment of refinery workers? What
about the effects on low income families of an increase in the cost
of gasoline?
5.2. Substantive Differences
The formal similarities between the parking problem and the
environmental risk problem reveal substantive differences in the
scale and complexity of the two problems. Some of the important
substantive differences are:
* The risk and damages associated with pollution are much
more difficult to quantify than the costs associated with parking
a car in the city. Environmental risk, as we understand it in
modern context, is a complicated chain of interactions, in which
it is difficult to assign causality to one set of activities.24 If the
environmental problem was that of dumping raw excrement into
the community water well, it would be relatively simple to
calculate the risk from this activity and analyze the costs and
benefits of alternative programs. Assessing the environmental risk
posed by an oil refinery, however, requires addressing problems
of marginal causes and effects (e.g., the impact of refinery effluent
given discharges from many other sources); multiple causes of
pollution (e.g., refinery effluent compared with ambient automo-
bile exhaust); and of latency of injury (e.g., impaired breathing or
certain diseases may occur many years after the exposure to
certain types of pollution).
* The problem of identifying compliance or deviance is fairly
simple when it depends on a relatively gross event, such as the
location of an improperly parked vehicle. Identifying the kind
and quantity of particulate emission from a modern factory or
refinery is much more complicated.
* The complexity of information transmission increases
exponentially as environmental controls endeavor to be more
exacting.2 If the environmental problem were simply that of
dumping excrement in the local water supply, the circle of
24 For a detailed analysis of the difficulties in dealing with the causality
issues for environmental risks, see J. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY(1988).
s For a discussion of the difficulty of effectively communicating
environmental risk, see Neil D. Weinstein & Peter M. Sandman, Some Criteria
for Evaluating Risk Messages, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 103 (1993).
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relevant actors and the number of information interchanges is
relatively straightforward. When the environmental problem is
that of controls on the amount and timing of exhaust from a
modern oil refinery, information transmission is vastly more
complicated. What kinds of emission detection devices are reliable
and who can certify their precision? Who is to read the meters
on the detection devices? What reports need to be written and to
whom should they be sent? If there is a breakdown, who is
"responsible" and what do they have to do?
* As the complexity of the information transmission system
increases, the incentives and disincentives presented to the relevant
actors for transmitting and acting upon information are increasing-
26ly delicate and difficult to estimate. What, exactly, are the
appropriate incentives for the head of the regulatory agency and
the CEO of the oil company to take preventive actions? What
motivates the claims adjusters from an insurance company after an
accident occurs? What rewards and punishments are required to
motivate the foremen at the refinery site to satisfy the firm's
objectives? The costs associated with these incentives are
connected with inspection, monitoring, control and policing
activities.
* The cost of achieving more exacting standards goes up
exponentially for environmental risks. Some environmentalists
want a Delaney-like clause that would shut down all refineries.
On the other hand, a large segment of the public may think that
the prices for gasoline and heating oil are already too high. For
this reason the question of "how safe is safe enough" poses
difficult and sometimes intractable questions of social equity.2
* The question of benefits also becomes more difficult and
controversial when one moves from the parking problem to
managing environmental risks. Should our generation take
account of health effects on "our" grandchildren, or of the
aesthetic effects of preserving a "natural" visual environment?28
26 See id.
27 See, e.g., Stephen L. Derby & Ralph L. Keeney, Risk Analysis:
Understanding "How Safe is Safe Enough?", in READINGS IN RISK 43 (Theodore
S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds., 3d ed. 1993).
28 A current controversy concerns whether there ought to be liability for
pollution which causes "aesthetic" damage to natural resources. See Roscoe
Trmmier, Jr. & Jay B. Smith, The Scope of Natural Resource Damage Liability
Under CERCLA, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC
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What benefits are considered relevant and which ones are viewed
as inappropriate in developing policies toward managing environ-
mental risks?
6. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined a set of different strategies for
managing environmental risk, ranging from command and control
to free play. The important question is how to structure the
regulations, standards, and incentives - both positive and negative
- so that private actors can be expected to respond. We believe
that private market institutions such as insurance and third party
inspections can play an important role, but that is another article.
The point we wish to make in this Article is that any policy
tool for managing environmental risks must be evaluated in the
context of the institutional arrangements between the affected
parties. A highly centralized system will have one sets of costs
and benefits and a system in which there are property rights
assigned to enterprises will have another. The devil is in the
details of successfully developing a desirable system, as the affected
society must simultaneously identify, contrast, and evaluate the
costs and benefits associated with implementing a set of programs
and policies.
As the above analysis shows, this is not easy to do. In the
international context this problem is seriously complicated by the
absence of any fully authoritative government structure that can
promulgate the rules of the "game." Nevertheless, the process
must inevitably occur if society is to manage environmental risk
in an efficient and effective manner that anticipates the role of
private parties.
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